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1. INTRODUCTION 
This report was written as a synthesis paper, fulfilling the requirements for 
Deliverable 29, under work package 5 of UNCOVER, UNderstanding the 
mechanisms of stock reCOVERy. The main task of which is to provide a “Strategy 
Options Evaluation Report,” to work package 6. The focus of this report centres on 
expectations of compliance and cooperation. 
 
The primary goal of UNCOVER was to define optimal strategies for recovery plans 
for the future in European waters. This came about due to the number of exploited 
fish stocks in European waters at historically low levels and in danger of collapse. For 
many of these stocks, management advice from ICES has been a closure of the 
fishery. In light of this situation, the purpose of UNCOVER was to develop recovery 
strategies for EU fish stocks which are outside of safe biological limits. In order to 
develop these recovery strategies, the principle objectives of UNCOVER were to 1) 
identify changes experienced during stock decline and their consequences for the 
prospects of stock recovery; 2) enhance the understanding of mechanisms of fish 
stock recovery; and 3) provide recommendations for the recovery of EU fish stocks, 
which are outside of safe biological limits.  
 
For this report, data from the UNCOVER report on SIAs and Community Profiles 
(D.28) have been synthesized with data from the Report on the application of bio-
economic and compliance theory to three case studies (D.27) both of which were a 
part of work package 5, Task 5.4. 
 
Social impact assessments (e.g., as seen in D.28) are a key component for evaluating 
stock recovery plans, especially given the Community Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
mandate of the social and economic stability of communities along with the 
environmental sustainability of the stocks. For UNCOVER, social impact assessments 
were undertaken in 6 communities, using two stock recovery plans as the basis: 
Northern Hake and North Sea Cod. Social impact assessments are most successful 
when used in concert with community profiles.  
 
Community Profiling is a methodology for understanding how impacts that are 
primarily economic can be evaluated in a broader context. Generally-speaking, an SIA 
is a methodical assessment of the quality of life of persons and communities whose 
social, cultural, and natural environment is affected by policy changes, such as 
through the fisheries management and recovery plans. Social impacts refer to changes 
to individuals and communities due to management actions which alters the day-to-
day way in which people live, work, relate to one another, organize to meet their 
needs, and generally cope as members of a fisheries society. Social impact assessment 
provides an appraisal of possible social ramifications and proposals for management 
alternatives, often with possible mitigation measures. 
 
A bio-economic modelling approach was applied to fleet level data, associated with 
the North Sea Cod, Plaice and Herring, and Anchovy and Hake at the Bay of Biscay, 
in order to quantitatively measure expected fishers’ response to alternative recovery 
plans. This was done specifically in terms of fishers’ decisions such as effort 
allocation, discards, as well as the resulting outcomes such as profit and fishing 
mortality. A combination of fisheries was evaluated against the different management 
strategies. 
 
Combined, the assessment of the impacts of management measures on society, 
culture, and institutions, and the bio-economic modelling of management strategies, 
are methods which complement one another, though admittedly combining such 
methods remains challenging, and needs further work. Similar findings, such as with 
the compliance issue in the case of Northern Hake in Spain, were also supported with 
the same results uncovered using different methods. 
 
As suggested in D.27, The effectiveness of any regulation in place depends on the 
manner of its enforcement, and the impact it has on the stakeholders. While the 
primary aim of fisheries regulations is to safeguard and regenerate the resource for 
sustainable use, the effect of the regulations on the short term objectives of 
stakeholders (e.g. maintaining profit) needs to be factored in an economic analysis for 
effective enforcement of the regulation. 
 
Currently, many important commercial European stocks are below their safe 
biological levels. Consequently, the long run sustainability of many European 
fisheries is highly questionable. Accordingly, a number of initiatives, such as closed 
areas, quantity restrictions, and gear restrictions have been implemented to facilitate 
the recovery of fisheries where there is risk of collapse. As these measures have 
involved restrictions on fishing activity, they will have had direct impacts on the 
livelihoods of fishers and regional communities.  
 
The bio-economic methods employed in the analysis included TEMAS, Fcube and 
ISIS-FISH models in the respective case studies. TEMAS is a multispecies, multi-
fleet, multi-country bio-economic model. TEMAS models the link between technical 
management measures and fishing mortality. The resulting analytical tool was flexible 
enough to accommodate the salient biological, fleet and economic features of the 
fisheries in the North Sea case study. An additional important feature of the model 
included the explicit and detailed fleet component enabling the depiction of the 
relationship between management measures and fleet dynamics. These features 
enabled researchers to see how aspects of the fleets are changed as a response to the 
regulatory schemes, their influence on fishers’ behaviour, and subsequently, their 
impact on measures like effort allocation and profit, discarding. (CEMARE, et al. 
2009:1) 
 
The Bio-economic report focused on evaluating fishers’ responses to major recovery 
plans with regard to their effectiveness in reducing fishing mortality and their 
associated socioeconomic impacts. Within this task, analysis focused on 
decommissioning (capacity management), days at sea reduction, and mesh size 
restrictions. (CEMARE, et al. 2008, UNCOVER D.27:1) 
 
Decommissioning was shown to have a strong overall effect in reducing fishing 
mortality across fleets and fisheries. At the same time, it was found that overlapping 
restrictions may be more effective than a single regulation in reducing fishing 
mortality. However, and unfortunately, when looking in terms of the socio-cultural 
impacts, overlapping regulations can potentially serve to increase frustration and 
confusion, and with it, anomie and negative impacts on quality of life.  
 
Analyses using the Fcube model on Hake at the Bay of Biscay indicate that gradual 
decreases in effort certain fleets do not affect the effort of other fleets, probably 
because of shifts in target species and tendency not to use all vessel capacity. 
 
The results from the ISIS FISH model for Anchovy in the Bay of Biscay show that 
more than the implemented MPA, given the structure of the dynamic model 
developed, fisher's behaviour and spatial fish distribution have a strong impact on the 
performances of management strategies. 
 
The socio-cultural and community analysis focused on two stocks: North Sea Cod and 
Northern Hake in the Bay of Biscay. Consequently, the comparative analysis and this 
synthesis focus on these two stock recovery plans, communities, and fleets. 
2. SYNOPSIS 
As would be expected, the situations found in both the communities and fleets 
researched vary considerably; as did the methods underlying the results between the 
two reports; yet in some instances, these complemented one another. They also 
strengthened the results by providing similar results despite different methods.  
 
In general, in order for effects of the recovery plans to be felt, there must be 
compliance: fleets and fishers must actually change their behaviour. If the short term 
costs are viewed as being too high and if the plan does not have “buy-in” than fleets 
and fishers may not alter their actions and “comply” as desired by scientists and 
managers for rebuilding. After all, incentives exist to “cheat” when catches are lower 
due to their need to operate as businesses; they must compensate for revenue losses.  
 
The Bay of Biscay Northern Hake fishery is a specialized fishery whereby boats 
cannot easily switch to alternative species (e.g., to cover such revenue losses). There 
was no stakeholder public comment period on the plan, as there were no real forums 
for input available; the Northwestern and Southwestern Waters RACs had not yet 
been formed at the time of the implementation of the Recovery Plan. It is assumed 
that when a plan is not adjusted for the needs of stakeholders, they may move away 
from adherence to avoid the increased costs of the plan. Careful consideration of the 
drafting of the legislation - as well as enforcement, of course - can decrease costs and 
therefore increase compliance. Some costs include fixed (sunk) investment and labour 
(fixed contracts and thus can not be easily dismissed). Both the bio-economic 
modelling and the social impact assessment showed limited impacts due to limited 
levels of compliance.  
 
The bio-economic TEMAS model focusing on North Sea Cod found that in response 
to decommissioning management measures, effort, profitability, and discards (in most 
cases) decreased. Decommissioning had a strong overall effect in reducing fishing 
mortality across fleets and fisheries, though effort reduction was uneven across the 
fisheries. It was found that reducing the number of vessels by 10% reduces the profit 
within 5-20%. The impact is stronger for smaller vessels. Days at sea (DAS) 
reductions also reduced profits by similar percentages (except Norwegian vessels). 
 
At the community level, qualitative interviews uncovered continued stress among 
certain levels of society, though these varied temporally and sectorally.  
 
In Urk, the Netherlands, continued restrictions decreased firms’ profitability, as well 
as increase stress in the society: particularly along the lines of recruitment issue and 
health. Retail consumption patterns have also shifted. Certain segments of the sector 
are also particularly at risk, such as those in their 40s and 50s, less able to switch over, 
and families with the cultural tradition of wives remaining as homemakers. Ancillary 
industries are limited. Lesser-known groups are potentially at risk with the decrease in 
landings, such as the self-employed fish graders working in the fish market.  
 
In Peterhead, The fishing industry is impacted by low profitability - prices had been 
good, overall, for whitefish in the two years previous to fieldwork (November 2007). 
However, in spring of 2008, fuel prices greatly increased. If prices decline, however, 
the industry will face increased difficulty. This comes as no surprise to anyone 
familiar with fisheries. Specific support industries, such as net repairers, are 
particularly vulnerable while generalized firms, such as engineers, have made 
transitions. The port has managed to diversify - the port is expanding into more 
pelagics and the shellfish landings have doubled in the last two years. This is good for 
the Port Authority and those connected to servicing them. Limited impact on the 
community overall, especially shops, though these are in great decline, as in many 
other small towns throughout the Northeast of Scotland. As with Urk (NL) and 
Thorsminde (DK), low recruitment of crew and staff continues to be an important 
issue in fishing and processing sectors. Currently the catching sector seems to have 
stabilized, while the processing sector has been hit hard by the combination of the 
CRP and the Registry of Buyers and Sellers introduced in 2005, and came into full 
force in January 2006); currently there are only 4 main processing firms remaining in 
Peterhead.  
 
Thorsminde, Denmark, is a particularly small port with limited opportunities to 
diversify within and without the fishing industry. They have been hit by the change in 
quota allocation in Denmark, the Cod Recovery Plan, as well as the Plaice and Sole 
management plan. Though designated as a port for cod landings, the Thorsminde 
auction did not receiver increased landings from boats from other ports as expected. 
Facing severe recruitment problems, some fishers prefer to retire than to work with 
foreign crew.  
3. NORTH SEA COD (GADUS MORHUA) 
Social impacts of the Cod Recovery Plan were undertaken in three North Sea 
communities, for a minimum of two weeks each. In the North Sea, all stocks of 
roundfish and flatfish have been exposed to high levels of fishing mortality over the 
past century. For most of these stocks their lowest observed spawning stock biomass 
has been seen in recent years (ICES 2004). North Sea cod in particular has been 
outside of ‘safe biological limits’ since the late 1980s and North Sea plaice since 1994 
(ICES 2005). Over the past 2-3 years a number of different management measures 
(e.g. area closure, effort reduction, drastic TAC cuts) have been applied in an attempt 
to rebuild the cod stock, yet it is still only at 20-25 % of the level it was in 1990. 
Similarly, the establishment of a partially closed area in 1989 (‘plaice box’) has not 
prevented the plaice stock from continuing to decline (Pastoors et. al. 2000).  
 
In 1999 the EU and Norway agreed to implement a long-term management plan for 
the North Sea cod stock. This was intended to constrain harvesting within ‘safe 
biological limits’ and to provide for sustainable fisheries and greater potential yield in 
the future (a ‘cod-recovery plan’). The latest proposal from the European Commission 
(Reg 2003/0090 (SNS)) includes both effort reduction/control and Harvest Control 
Rules (HCR) for setting TACs. In 2003 scientists recommended complete closure of 
fisheries catching cod in the North Sea, including severe restrictions on vessels 
targeting other species (e.g. haddock), but which catch cod as accidental by catch 
(ICES 2004). 
 
In 1999, the EU and Norway agreed to implement a long-term management plan for 
the North Sea plaice stock (ICES 2004), and a plaice (sub-area IV) ‘recovery plan’ is 
now under consideration. Increased mortality as a result discarding practices appears 
to be a particular threat to plaice recovery. 
 
Given the mixed fisheries nature of harvesting commercial stocks in the North Sea, 
impact assessments were not only conducted in the whitefish (cod) extraction 
communities of Peterhead (Scotland) and Thorsminde (Denmark), but also in the 
plaice and sole extraction community of Urk (the Netherlands). This is due to the 
impact the quota restrictions on Plaice, Sole, and Turbot in the Cod Recovery Plan.  
4. NORTHEN HAKE (MERLUCCIUS MERLUCCIUS) EMERGENCY AND 
RECOVERY PLANS 
Three social impact assessments were conducted seeking to address the socio-cultural 
impacts of the Northern hake (Merluccius merluccius) emergency and recovery plans 
of 2000 and 2004, respectively, in the Basque region of Spain and the Guilvinec 
region of France. In Spain, the selection of two community profiles was based on high 
level of dependence on the Northern hake fishery. The communities of Ondarroa and 
Pasajes (Pasaia) were investigated for two weeks each using rapid assessment 
protocol, a standard method for conducting Social Impact Assessments (SIAs). This 
method incorporates ethnographic investigation along with archival research to 
produce a community profile based on the effects of significantly altered regulations, 
typically in communities with a high level of dependence on an extractive natural 
resource. 
 
In France, given the nature of the fishery today, a regional approach was taken to 
“community” and work was concentrated in the region of Guilvinec, using the same 
methods. The maritime district of Guilvinec constitutes a particular territory with a 
specific cultural characteristic and it is called Bigouden Country. There are 4 harbours 
in this district: Guilvinec, Lesconil, Loctudy and Saint Guenolé. Guilvinec district is 
divided in two types of fisheries: small scale fisheries and offshore fisheries. Like Urk 
in the Netherlands, the main concern was not of the primary catching sector, but 
rather those which catch hake as “bycatch”, in this instance, juvenile langoustines. In 
Guilvinec, fishing strategies have adjusted to fit the new regulations; fishmongers 
who supply the Spanish market have been impacted.  
5. EXPECTATIONS ON COMPLIANCE AND COOPERATION 
Based upon the bio-economic modelling and the social impact assessments, some 
views on the expectations on compliance and cooperation are provided in this section. 
First, however, some intellectual underpinnings to the issue of compliance will be 
presented. This is necessary to set the stage in order to understand behaviour.  
 
It should be noted in considering the issue of compliance that compliance behaviour 
partly depends on the understanding and belief that changes are inevitable (Bressers 
and Bruijn 2005). Without such belief, behaviour may not be likely to adjust to 
changing circumstances. In the past, as Raakjær and Mathiesen (2003) point out, 
compliance to management measures was often understood from an economic 
perspective, assuming that fishers act in economically rational terms, and assumes that 
fishers calculate the economic gain to be made from by-passing regulations compared 
to the risk of detection and facing fines (Raakjær and Mathiesen 2003). This idea has 
influenced fisheries managers where increased enforcement is seen to the way to go. 
However, as Kuperan and Sutinen (1998) argue, “even in situations where the 
investment in enforcement is considerable, it can be questioned whether an increased 
effort will actually reduce the number of violations” (in Raakjær and Mathiesen:1). In 
fact, fishers were often found to be creative in finding ways to avoid getting caught in 
breaking the rules. Why would they, for example, report to their otherwise 
competitive peers, the activities and movements of enforcement agents on sea and in 
the ports (ibid: 1)? Some studies (e.g. Sutinen et al. 1990) have shown that low 
economic sanctions can partly explain the levels of non-compliance. Other empirical 
studies have shown that this issue may be a bit more complicated (e.g. Hatcher et. al., 
2000; Hønneland, 1998). In addition to the  
 
“influence of regulation, enforcement, economic benefits and the 
accessibility of fish in the sea, the compliance behaviour may be 
influenced by the behaviour of others and the moral values of the 
individual fisher.” … The influence of norms and what the fisher 
considers as fair and morally correct are important aspects of the 
normative analysis. Although fishing is a commercial and highly 
competitive business, a variety of non-monetary incentives is in 
place, such as: social pressure, tradition, moral, knowledge about 
fishing (experience and skill) (Jentoft, 1998; Maurstad, 1998; 
Raakjær and Mathiesen 2003: 2).  
 
Norms are defined as the typical actions and attitudes, and the expectations regarding 
the behaviour and attitude of peers; they may work as social pressure, which creates 
both positive and negative sanctions (Giddens 1984), for examples the Dutch 
Biesheuvel system.  
 
Of course, lack of compliance in the fisheries, despite increased enforcement 
activities, brings attention to the importance of legitimacy of fisheries management. 
“Legitimacy is considered as a normative phenomenon, and differs from moral in the 
sense that legitimacy is linked to a political authority (system), while moral may or 
may not be” (Raakjær and Mathiesen 2003).  
 
 “Legitimacy exists when the members of a society see adequate reason for feeling 
that they should voluntarily obey the command of authorities” (Easton 1958). In 
thinking of the issue of legitimacy, Jentoft (1989:139) emphasizes that four factors 
have important influence on the existence of legitimacy:  
 
1. content of the regulations;  
2. distributional effects;  
3. making of the regulations; and finally  
4. implementation of the regulations, where the hypothesis is, that “the more 
directly involved the fishermen are in installing and enforcing the 
regulation, the more the regulation will be accepted as legitimate.”  
 
Ideas of equity also play an important role in compliance. Is it viewed as fair to 
themselves? And more importantly, do the fishers believe that other fleets will also 
follow suit? As qualitative interviews showed, they may be less likely to comply if 
they do not feel the system is equitable.  
 
5.1. Compliance in the bio-economic studies 
An empirical analysis of compliance was not provided by any of the case studies 
conducted for the bio-economic and compliance theory case studies, though there are 
some studies currently underway in other EU projects, such as COBECOS 
(CEMARE, AZTI, and IFREMER 2009: iv). Studies incorporating compliance 
behaviour have been limited to either full compliance, or none at all (Tidd, Hutton and 
Hillary 2009). Consequently, such models have difficulty in accounting for real-world 
behaviour, whereby compliance often falls between such all-or-none compliance 
levels. Furthermore, the bio-economic modelling shows that it is important to show 
the probability of detection of violators an essential component of understanding 
compliance behaviour as related to the status of the stock.  
 
Detection, and the related compliance, also impacts the status of communities and 
subsectors at the social and cultural levels. For the North Sea Cod, the introduction of 
the Registry of Buyers and Sellers in the UK (2005) had a significant impact upon the 
numbers of processors operating in Peterhead, for example.  Processors now operating 
in Peterhead have fallen to four, which is a significant decline from previously. 
 
The reduction in the number of vessels over all the fleet groups resulted in a total 
increase in the number of discards. For both 10% and 20% simulations, the impact of 
decommissioning on discards is larger for cod than the other two fisheries. The 10% 
increase show that the increase in discards is smooth and shows a steady rise with 
larger sized vessels on average. In contrast, the change in discards due to a 20% 
change in the number of boats shows a more fluctuating pattern across all sizes.  
 
Reduction of days at sea shows that the percentage change in discards is slightly less 
than 10% for a small change in days at sea, but reaches almost 20% for when effort is 
reduced by a larger margin. Comparison with the simulation across fisheries shows 
that, discard patterns are similar but lower for herring and plaice than for cod.  
 
Analysis of the effects of increases in minimum mesh size shows that the amount of 
discards increases on average by 3 percent and 6 percent (10% and 20% levels, 
respectively). The effect of increased mesh size on discards is smoother for Belgian 
and UK fleets. When minimum mesh size is increased to 20%, the percentage increase 
in discards increases for all the fleets, but with increased fluctuation across fleets. 
Although differences in magnitude are observed, the impacts of the regulatory 
measures- reduced days at sea, increased mesh size exhibit similar patterns across the 
three fisheries. 
 
5.2. Compliance in Social Impact Assessments 
If alternatives exist, and there is support for technological changes, compliance can be 
seen in some segments of the fisheries. For example, in France’s Guilvinec district, 
fishing strategies have adjusted in the face of management measures. For most of the 
fleet targeting hake, the strong impact that would have this regulation on the main 
fishing activity, the langoustines catching, of the vessels from Guilvinec has been a 
major incentive to develop more selective fishing practices. Due to the strong 
interaction between the two fishing activities, fishers from Guilvinec have tried to find 
new ways to maintain their fishing activity in the future.  
 
In the other cases, interviewed fishers spoke of a desire to comply, but also grappled 
with the difficulty of obtaining enough quota to run their operations, as well as their 
inability to switch gears and species. 
6. SIMILARITIES IN THE CASE STUDIES  
There are a number of similarities found between the between the cases of North Sea 
Cod and Northern Hake in regards to social and economic impacts of the stock 
recovery plans. 
 
• Specialization makes it difficult to switch (species; gears) in time of crisis.  
Many of the fleets analyzed practice a specialized harvesting strategy.  Historically, 
fleets and fishers often practiced a broad-spectrum subsistence/harvesting strategy in 
which they often shifted among species and gear depending upon the season and local 
conditions.  In the current situation with strict quota and management limits, fleets 
and fishers find it difficult to switch species and gears as they would have 
traditionally done. The inability to switch negatively impacts both the economy and 
potentially, the society.  Such difficulties in switching gears were shown in the bio-
economic analysis report as well as in qualitative interviews, in both the Northern 
Hake and Cod Recovery Plan fleets.  For example, for the parajes in Spain, they have 
no ability to reduce their effort by switching gears.  The Northern hake fishery cannot 
switch to alternative species due to high technical specialization and low mobility. 
Fleet equipment fixed costs can be considered almost as sunk costs of the gear. This is 
due to the high cost of the gear that includes not only the large nets, but the machinery 
to haul them and the electronic equipment and software to control both. In addition to 
this, the second hand market for the gear is only very residual and is reduced to 
individual operations taking place only very seldom between fishing companies. More 
often, gear is only sold together with the vessel or as a consequence of scrapping. This 
is closely related to the longer term behaviour of this fleet, where very few changes of 
métier occur (less than ten baka-pareja switches from 1995 to 2005) and the time and 
resources needed to switch from one métier to the other (and therefore the opportunity 
cost incurred) are considerable. 
 
• A real desire for long-term management plans 
  
Fishers in all cases (Hake, NS cod) voiced a desire and need for stability and ease of 
planning purposes.  Qualitative interviews uncovered a high degree of consensus in 
the desire for long term management plans among fleets from the case studies. Most 
interviewed discussed the business nature of the industry and their need to plan for 
investments. Some examples cited included improvements to ships, as well as the 
purchase of additional quota. One skipper, for example, spoke of buying quota, only 
to have it taken away the next month. When skipper and firm owners are able to plan 
for the future with some sense of reliability and assurance, they can potentially make 
long-terms decisions, in theory, increasing the likelihood of sustainable decision-
making. 
 
• Impacts will only be seen if fishers/fleets are compliant (e.g., Northern 
Hake).  
 
It is common sense that economic and social impacts of stock recovery plans will only 
be seen if fishers and fleets are compliant. Compliance can potentially increase with 
buy-in, long-term planning, and avenues for stakeholder input into the process. 
However, in the case of the Northern hake in the Bay of Biscay, the recovery plan was 
never agreed upon by stakeholders. Consequently, it was assumed in the bio-
economic modelling that compliance will have costs which affect fishers’ behaviour 
and choice of adhering to the plan. One example of costs include fixed investment and 
labour: most have fixed contracts and consequently, skippers can not dismiss part of 
the crew in order to adapt to the Plan’s impact on their profitability.  
 
• Incorporating compliance indicators into the bio-economic modelling has 
potential, especially if these include a realistic view of compliance; 
specifically, in the range between full or non-compliance. 
 
Incorporating compliance indicators into the bio-economic modeling has potential, 
especially if these include a realistic view of compliance; specifically, in the range 
between full or non- compliance. Attempts at incorporating compliance behaviour 
into fisheries bio-economic models have been very limited. This has mainly got to do 
with the implicit assumption in bio-economic analyses that there is full compliance or 
where there is no compliance at all (Hutton et al., 2001). Given this, bio-economic 
analyses that incorporate compliance levels that fall between the full- and no-
compliance extremes will contribute to a better understanding of fisheries compliance 
behaviour. One area where bio-economic analyses could contribute to better 
understanding of compliance behaviour is how fishers’ behaviour is adjusted to the 
dynamics of the fishery biomass as well as to the corresponding evolution of the 
regulatory mechanisms (dynamic parameters corresponding to the regulations), and 
when even the probability of detection is endogenous in the bio-economic model. 
 
• Combining the bio-economic analysis with the socio-cultural analysis has 
great potential. 
 
Bio-economic analysis can provide quantitative data which support explanatory, 
qualitative data and descriptions.  Provided, of course, the parameters for the bio-
economic modelling are set appropriately and the necessary data are available.  When 
an individual fishing firm, for example, speaks of investment costs with changing 
mesh sizes, the bio-economic modelling can show both the economic impact along 
with the estimated stock increase along fleet lines. The bio-economic analyses provide 
a macro level view on the situation, while the micro-level analysis provides insight 
into the behaviour of individuals and firms which make up the fleets.  The qualitative 
and quantitative methods can complement and support one another with varying 
methods, thereby potentially strengthening the results.  
7. FINAL TAKE HOME LESSONS 
This final section presents some concluding thoughts on social and economic impacts 
which warrant particular emphasis.  
 
• Keep in mind that social and economic impacts can be cumulative, 
consequently other legislation, policies, and recovery plans should be 
included in analyses.  
 
Social and economic impacts do not take place in a vacuum, away from other 
management activities and social and economic occurrences. A small change in 
management or legislation may, in fact, be “the straw which breaks the camel’s back” 
so-to-speak in economic and social terms. Cumulative impacts in society are loosely 
similar to the cumulative impacts seen in the environment whereby “Many processes 
and changes … take place below the surface, silently, on large scales and over long 
time periods” and on the “the natural …. their capacity to act as natural buffers, is 
likely to diminish in [the] future” (UNEP 2009: Chapter 5: 1). Economies and 
societies which are continually hit will have a more difficult time responding; they are 
not as healthy and robust as other communities faced with restrictions by policies and 
management measures.  
 
For example, among the Dutch beamtrawl fleet (Annex 5), The Cod Recovery Plan 
severely limited fleet activities through DAS schemes and reduced mesh sizes. 
Though this may not explain by itself why 40% of the Urk fishing firms were 
technically bankrupt in 2007, it could be said the combination of the Cod Recovery 
Plan, the Long-term Plaice and Sole Management Plan, high fuel costs, reduced 
quotas, increased imports of competing species like pangasius, with low prices for 
have all combined to place the fleet in a precarious position. Once one combines the 
state of the fleet with the cultural and societal parameters of quality of life issues 
(preferences for being with family and going to church on weekends), limited 
education levels and employment opportunities, especially for women of a certain 
generation, unwillingness to move away from Urk, to name some boundaries – all 
place Urk households and the Urk community in a vulnerable and less resilient 
position. The community of Thorsminde, Denmark is also in a precarious position, in 
their case, aggravated by their small size, remote location, and limited alternative 
opportunities.  
 
• Impacts affect subsectors at different times and to varying degrees, and this 
includes divisions along gender and demographic lines, as well as the 
expected subsectors. 
 
Communities and economic sectors are heterogeneous. Consequently, impacts affect 
subsectors at different times and to varying degrees, and this includes gender and 
demographics. For example, in Urk, there is a generational difference in education 
levels. While in Peterhead, Scotland, wives may leave the home to find employment, 
in Urk, most girls leave school at 16 and work in processing firms. Consequently, they 
are limited in the types of employment they are qualified for. And this assumes there 
is a cultural expectation that they may work away from the home; there may be 
cultural preferences that they do not. Additionally, men in their late 30s, 40s and 50s, 
also have a more limited education which impacts where they may be able to find 
employment, if even they have a cultural preference for it (e.g., on any kind of boat, 
such as barges or dredgers rather than land-based work).  
 
As far as subsectors are concerned, the catching sector is often affected first with any 
change in regulation. And this has a trickle-down effect on fish agents (Peterhead), 
auction houses (Urk), support firms such as engineers, painters, grocers and net 
makers (Thorsminde, Peterhead, Urk). Particularly with support firms, it should be 
understood that often there is a minimum number of boats necessary to support the 
industry. Too few boats, and support industry closes down. And once support industry 
leaves, they may not be able to return. This is particularly true in North America and 
ports which have switched over to high end housing in port areas, and to tourism as 
the main replacement industry.  
 
• Increased regulation without the perception of a say in the process can 
increase anomie and stress in communities and fleets 
 
As Jentoft (2000) has pointed out, “Fishermen are born, raised and live in local 
communities. They are enmeshed in cultural and social systems that give meaning to 
their lives and directions for their behaviour. Their fishing practices are guided by 
values, norms and knowledge that are shared within their community” (2000: 54). 
Jentoft then argues, following Emile Durkheim, that “overfishing/the Tragedy of the 
Commons may well be a consequence of anomie, that is normative confusion, which 
occurs when social ties are weak and moral standards unclear.” Consequently, 
following this reasoning, there could result a continuing vicious cycle of threat to 
stocks in communities which are under threat with management plans. “Overfishing 
results when the norms of self-restraint, prudence and community solidarity have 
eroded. It occurs when fishermen do not care about their resource, their community 
and about each other. Then, their ability to communicate among themselves, to agree 
and to cooperate is lost. Instead, their social relations are featured with opportunism, 
strife and conflict. Hence, their capacity for collective action becomes severely 
weakened” (2000: 54). With this in mind, it stands to reason that managers include the 
community into the process. 
 
• Feeling of fairness imperative 
 
Tied into this feeling of needing a say in the process, is a feeling of fairness. 
Interviews, particularly in the North Sea Case Studies, uncovered this feeling of 
unfairness. Fishers and industry members feel a need for fairness across members 
States, as well as among fleets in the same country.  
 
Keeping in mind the social and economic nature of fisheries and fishing communities, 
it is prudent to not only investigate social impacts in order to mitigate negative 
impacts which may result from new management measures, but also to include the 
community into the process for the health and improvement of the fish stocks 
themselves.  
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